S-E2CC! “The next paradise is a long way off!”

Disappointed S-E2CC-holders have been offered a supposedly generous upgrade. The current “sheep” have gratefully taken it up, following the herd with their praise. Has BCR/Lyconet told them how this miserable apportionment came to be? Could it have had something to do with unauthorised activity in Turkey? In any case, the same old games still work. A former country package investor summed it up back in August 2013:

“Recruit paying members, then change the agreements and rules, backpedal on promises; once the losses come up, act like they’re saviours and tie up the payments you’re already made in a supposed solution for a few more years. THAT’S LYONESS!”

Nothing has changed after all the new company registrations up to myWorld as what they called an “upgrade” didn’t go “through the roof” to use the BCR/Lyconet terminology, it completely and utterly failed.

Many S-E2CC investors have now confirmed what the member quoted above saw and experienced back in 2013.

On 28 June 2020, one S-E2 investor wrote as follows:

“They sold me something completely different. They told me I’d break even in three years and profit every month after that. They then corrected that claim (after I’d bought in) that it would break even through to maturity and maybe make a small profit. Apart from that, they deleted all the old videos from the BCR Group as they knew full well that they could be taken to court over it. (A screenshot was taken, however)

“Considering that they reached a volume of 42.15 over three years corresponding to around €1.50 per month, the next dividend would amount to €1.50 with the Cloud making a loss of 1,300–1,400.
“I now have three options:

1.   Sue

2.   Sell the Clouds on what they call the Cloud Exchange for half price, and make a 50% loss

3.   Upgrade and wait another three years.”

Another S-E2 investor wrote the following on 29 June 2020:

“Lyoness has been playing the great upgrade game since time immemorial. The promised benefits never came out of these ‘products’ for the discount voucher purchasers. Instead, the upline would tell you to ‘Pay in more, get an upgrade, buy into the new improved Cloud and you’ll get more cash later.’ See a pattern? (Note: More of not much is still not a lot…)

“They start a new game with their super reputable projections every few years, a new product is launched on the market, and you can buy as many discount vouchers as you want if you’re not up to your eyeballs in debt by then. Lyoness is like a black hole. You can throw all your money in, but nothing comes out except bizarre promises. Unless you find enough suckers to follow your lead.”

There’s nothing more to say. According to the motto: “I can only pay my debts if you lend me more money.”

“Disillusionment in paradise” – S-E2CC apportionment “A truly bizarre experience!”

The S-E2CC apportionment scheduled for 25 March has been postponed twice due to COVID-19 and software problems. Payday was now 26 June 2020. Even so, enthusiasm amongst Cloud investors has been rather muted. The familiar Lyconet and BCR pushers have probably already taken their cut.

There have always been complaints from Cloud investors, even back in the days of the country packages where absolutely nothing “went through the roof” and the “passive income” never materialised.

Even so, the number of complaints has been extraordinarily large in this Cloud scheme. 

“What a load of rubbish they told us!” – “Is this what we’ve been waiting three years for?” – “Thanks for nothing!” to quote some of the e-mails we have been receiving.

Excerpt from one e-mail (we have the original):

“… I invested in the SE2 Cloud scheme two years ago on the recommendation of a former friend, a BCR member.

The payment date was finally scheduled for 25 March 2020, and at long last, today is payday.

What happened next in the back office was truly bizarre.

A Cloud I’d invested €XXXX in had yielded a bit over € 40. After three years of waiting.

I’ve been saddled with a total loss of more than € XXXXX, and I know plenty of people who have invested in these and other “Clouds” … I was at the BCR conference in February and May 2018.

I also went to plenty of business briefings where they were raving about passive income the whole time.

I can name names: Andreas Matuska, Markus Käfer, Sebastian Hager, Mario Kapun, Giuliano Esposito, Ferhat Güngor, Daniel Rummler, Gerry und Walther Seebacher, Thomas Knittl, Fabian Lehner

All these people called on us to invest in their Cloud scheme presenting their amazing ROC projections.

I could go on for hours about all the promises they made.”

In keeping with the Cloud apportionment, BCR blowhard A. Matuska tried to pull the wool over the eyes of his followers in a video message; this is what he wrote:


The company apologises for the delay due to COVID-19 and will be rewarding all SE2 CLOUD investors with a payout for ONE ADDITIONAL YEAR! (SE2 was still an old Cloud scheme)

We’ll also be booking a FREE FULL SHARE in Enterprise Cloud 4 for every SE2 Cloud investor, so every SE2 Cloud investor will be participating in all 47 countries FOR LIFE :)”

This is how you keep your downline under control – just up the antes a little.

“Cave painting” by myWorld! 100 million members in the next three years! Amazon and Alibaba will be replaced as world market leaders!

Once again, A. Matuska worked himself up into an enraged diatribe with the style and sophistication of a five-year-old from a Viennese housing estate in the webinar of 20 June 2020. Yes, mistakes had been made in the past. The system had been too complicated, but now everything was more transparent and simplified as he explained in his apparent enlightenment.

After all the guff we have been served up with from these Lyoness/Lyconet/myWorld spin merchants these past few years, the changes announced as a “quantum leap” at the webinars of 12 and 20 June 2020 go to show once again the vapid dreamworld the members have been lured into. Even back in in 2009/2010/2013/2014 and 2015, they were making lots of proclamations that there would only be the Lyoness Cashback Card in the next two years and there would be no way of getting around it; there was even talk of world domination.

Now they have set their sights on a total of a hundred million people recruited as new members within the next two years, even though nobody knows how many members the pyramid scheme actually has up to now. No reliable figures have yet been published; just vague numbers calculated from the proceeds from Cloud sales as well as “issued but unused cards” as they had mentioned years ago but never verified. This is the continuous increase in member numbers that myWorld/Lyconet likes to project. Cashback World should finally publish how many of the issued cards have actually been activated and used. The fact of the matter is that whenever figures had to be published, the upshot was that around ninety percent of the proceeds came from selling the Cloud and ten percent from Cashback World. The rest is simple mathematics. So where on earth are all the alleged billions in proceeds announced in the webinars coming from?

This harks back to the MasterCard lie – and how they were congratulating themselves in the social media back then. “It’s all going through the roof now” – “Anyone that’s not in on it now is forfeiting their own future” – “Lyoness will be making us all rich” – “In two years there’ll only be Lyoness MasterCard” etc. etc. But it was all a pack of lies to recruit new members. The same goes for the Austrian BAWAG Card.

They should just disclose all their figures at myWorld – for all business divisions. After years of demands from the Norwegian authorities, they were finally forced to disclosure there and Lyoness/Lyconet was prohibited – even if A. Matuska still denies it.

Personal note: Comparing Hubert Freidl with Jeff Bezos of Amazon or Jack Ma of Alibaba is hard to beat in terms of flagrant ignorance and gall. The latter two gentlemen are genuine creators, and this Hubert Freidl seriously wants us to believe that he and his merry band of pushers will be taking the lead off these two companies in two years. Even the thoroughly brainwashed myWorld sheep are starting to come to their senses; quoting BCR president Andreas Matuska and his new favourite word repeated an untold number of times at the last seminar: “SICK!”

Trouble in paradise! S-E2CC apportionment postponed again!

After repeated delays in the S-E2CC apportionment, the new date is now 26 June 2020.

The previously planned apportionments were repeatedly postponed due to Corona whereas payments into the Enterprise Cloud X scheme went perfectly smoothly. Software issues were a popular justification back in the times of the country packages too.

Upline has been reacting with increasing hostility and aggressiveness towards members enquiring on the whereabouts of their invested funds.

We have recordings and messages from Lyconet and BCR groups where members were immediately blocked or removed just for enquiring about S-E2CC apportionment within the group. One particularly brazen case saw a marketer trying to explain the behaviour of a certain Markus Käfer and so on. In his opinion, it was “unacceptable for people to think they could demand a response from a president in the group” – “The management has better things to do, ask the office if you have any issues.” However, the office is still sending automatic e-mail responses with reference to the corona crisis, depending on the enquiry. Despite all this, they are still pushing their alleged new transparency with upline providing everyone with support, but evidently only if they are existing members bringing new members into the pyramid scheme. As if the “chief honchos” like Matuska, Käfer and Oreggia could “walk on water.”

What a cushy number – anyone with questions can expect to be thrown of the group, people should not be bothering upline with such matters.

Lyoness/Lyconet! 21-page legal opinion.

The Central Prosecutor’s Office for Business Affairs and Corruption (WKStA) commissioned an expert report from court-appointed business expert Magistra Andrea Kamposch and Magister Christian Steiner; the report ran to twenty-one pages. The subject of the report was the Lyconet “Cloud” offer.

Hubert Freidl was unable to answer twelve of fourteen questions.

This was yet another incredible failure by the Austrian Justice system in the Lyoness/Lyconet matter as even the report it had itself commissioned was not admitted as evidence in the court proceedings, leaving seasoned lawyers at a loss for words.      

Extracts form the report:

LEDV(s) = Limited Edition Discount Voucher(s); SP(s) = Shopping Point(s); Respondent = Lyoness/Lyconet; KP = Plaintiff; [WKStA = Austrian Central Prosecutor’s Office for Business Affairs and Corruption]

001    ……. The report from business expert Magistra Andrea Komposch on the business model at dispute concluded that the discount vouchers, LEDVs and Clouds have no definition, that the advertising materials from the respondent are incomplete and misleading, and that there is a risk of total loss.

002    The discount vouchers and Clouds were a creation of the respondent’s CEO (Hubert Freidl). The WKStA interviewed him as a suspect on 31 January 2017. He was unable to respond to all fourteen questions although the idea and development were his creation, so he must have already known the answers. He has still not responded by way of written statements or certificates as he has promised. So not even the creator knows about his fantasy creations. All that mattered was that the product sounded promising with suggestions of high profits for credulous investors to be duped into it.

003    In any case, Freidl claims that the money has been billed as a liability towards the customers and has not been used for any other purpose (response to question 20).

004    The report indicates that the main factors deciding the success of the investment are undetermined, and are therefore under the arbitrary control of the respondent. References to findings from the report are marked as such with the appropriate marginal reference numbers in the following comments.

005    The respondent is therefore at liberty to define the service arbitrarily and bilk the investors, which is what happened.

006    The respondent evidently set up the business model deliberately in such a way as to extol the benefits of the investment but formulate the specifics so vaguely that the investment would inevitably end in a complete loss. The respondent was at liberty to determine the number of customers in a Cloud according to its own discretion and therefore also set shopping revenues arbitrarily. The investor is robbed of any say in the investment and is left to the whim of the respondent.

007    The respondent has not as yet supplied any verifiable documentation or evidence on the number of customers in a Cloud, or their shopping revenues. Instead, the respondent is perfectly happy to leave the investors empty-handed. Investors have lost their investment on the LEDVs and have not received any dividends. These Clouds are just empty bubbles sold as a profitable venture, but leave the investors with nothing. There is an obvious intent to defraud.

008    The advertising brochures claim that all registered customers are combined in the Cloud without referrers.

009    However, this fails to specify the period within which Cloud registrations are accepted before the Cloud starts; this (the number of registered customers) plays a role in SP volume (Ref. No. 50). This means that investors are misled about the number of customers, and the respondent alone is free to decide which customers are admitted to the cloud and which are not.

010    There are also inconsistencies in apportioning SPs. The advertising materials of the respondent promise that 1,500 or 500.00 SPs will be redeemed and paid out per LEDV against discount vouchers worth €1,500.00 or €500.00, respectively, in the initial apportionment. However, the respondent’s representations towards the assessor held that this was only an assumption, as the respondent could not in any way guarantee the scope and extent of cash or non-cash benefits that may result from participation in the Cloud (Ref. No. 36, 53).

011    The documents do not explain either the form that the redemption and payment would take in the discount voucher or the SP volume apportionment (Ref. No. 54).

012    The documents fail to make any clear indication of the date from which shopping revenues in target countries would be included in the proportional allocation of resulting SPs. Apart from that, there is no explanation as to how the respondent would be able to redeem and pay out the resulting generated SPs for discount vouchers. There is also little detail as to how many units would result from the SPs.

013    This precludes any explanation as to how the apportionment is made and what effect an apportionment would finally have (Ref. No. 55).

014    The presentations available from LYCONET on participation in the “Customer Clouds” do not indicate or explain in any specific terms:

  • What a customer actually gains from an LEDV at €1,500, and how this ultimately affects the customer other than fulfilling the requirement to participate in the Customer Cloud.
  • Whether the customer is entitled to use the €1,500 for purchases or has no entitlement to receipt in cash from this amount.
  • What the formulation “Redeemable value: Order value can be redeemed at 100%” with reference to the LEDV actually means.
  • The description that “the first 1,500 SPs per LEDV could be redeemed and paid out in discount vouchers worth €1,500” does not reveal any specific explanation, especially as redemption and payout evidently only take place at the amount of the discount vouchers already available. The formulation “apportionment of SP volume” amounting to the difference (between LEDV and discount voucher) does not yield any sufficient explanation either.
  • Why the initially apportioned number of SPs at €1,500 has been described as accepted.
  • The period within which registrations from LYONESS members are actually accepted before the Cloud starts on 8 September 2016.
  • This plays a role in the SP volume to be apportioned and the resulting SPs. (Ref. No. 57)

015    There is no explanation at all as to the risk of total loss in the Cloud investment; on the contrary, the investment is touted as safe and risk-free. The general impression from the professionally designed brochures misleadingly suggests that the discount vouchers and Clouds are a risk-free investment with guaranteed performance.

016    The report confirms that the advertising materials from the respondent are incomplete and misleading, that the respondent is in sole control of how the investors’ money is used and apportioned to investors, and that there is a risk of total loss.

017    The discount vouchers have no real cash value (Ref. No. 69).

018    LEDV value depends on future SPs and cannot be redeemed immediately as vouchers for goods (Ref. No. 72).

019    The success of the Customer Clouds depends chiefly on the establishment of a customer base (Ref. No. 77), which is the respondent’s responsibility.

020    The business failure of an investment in the Customer Clouds as a whole will inevitably result in a dead loss for each and every individual investor (Ref. No. 74, 77).

021    Investors are left with a claim for an indefinite amount, and the claim will not arise until a later date (Ref. No. 81).

022    The business model and Shopping Points calculation are intransparent for the most part (Ref. No. 81).

023    There is a significant period between purchase and apportionment of the first Shopping Points (Ref. No. 81)

024    There is in any case a risk of total loss beyond the general risk of insolvency, such as failure to recruit enough customers or any customers at all, or failure of customers to buy in sufficient amounts or generate Shopping Points (Ref. No. 81)

025    The respondent alone, not the investors, manages the capital invested in the customer Clouds; the respondent uses the funds collected to run the Customer Clouds without the participating investors’ involvement. The investors have no say as to which projects are targeted for the money (Ref. No. 86).

026    Summing up, there is no evidence that investors have any significant say on how the money is used or appropriated (Ref. No. 87).

Enterprise Cloud X! Have you read the Terms of Use?

Anyone inspired, bamboozled, or pressured by BCR blowhards such as A. Matuska and Maximilian Ölze into purchasing an EC X probably did not really read the Terms of Use for EC X as nobody of sound mind would accept these terms. Maybe one of the Lyconet marketers could enlighten us and explain the “Cloud” offering advertised as “the safest deal in the world”?

The first block in the Terms of Use – the disclaimer – claims that “Lyconet and also myWorld reserve the right to alter and/or withdraw this incentive at any time for any reason without notice.” This means that they can simply cancel any member’s alleged real-estate share without giving a reason. Andreas Matuska, Gerry Seebacher, Markus Käfer and (amongst other things) Hubert Freidl themselves claimed that this was “the safest deal in the world” and “unique” in their webinars.

Apart from that, each Enterprise Cloud X (EC X) member was to participate in the potential “retained earnings” from myWorld Enterprise Ltd., 3rd Floor, 40 Bank Street, London, E14 5NR, in the form of SPs (Shopping Points)


in the “net rental income” (less expenses) from named EC X projects of myWorld Real Estate Ltd., 3rd Floor, 40 Bank Street, London, E14 5NR, also in the form of SPs (Shopping Points).

Are Cloud X purchasers aware that myWorld Enterprise Ltd. is a “dormant limited” with only £100 share capital (see excerpt), and that myWorld Real Estate Ltd. has just £1 in registered share capital (see excerpt)?

We eagerly await the annual statements for 2020. But as the members already know, myWorld or Lyconet may alter or withdraw any previous approval without giving a reason. Nobody that we can see signs this kind of contract without the intention of earning off the backs of others by feeding more unsophisticated victims into this pyramid scheme.